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Abstract. recent defenders of the divine command theory like Adams and 
Alston have confronted the euthyphro dilemma by arguing that although God’s 
commands make right actions right, God is morally perfect and hence would 
never issue unjust or immoral commandments. on their view, God’s nature 
is the standard of moral goodness, and God’s commands are the source of all 
obligation. I argue that this view of divine goodness fails because it strips God’s 
nature of any features that would make His goodness intelligible. An adequate 
solution to the euthyphro dilemma may require that God be constrained by 
a standard of goodness that is external to Himself – itself a problematic proposal 
for many theists.
The euthyphro dilemma is often thought to present a fatal problem for 
the divine command theory (aka theological voluntarism). Are right acts 
commanded by God because they are right, or are they right because 
they are commanded by God? If the former, then there is a standard of 
right and wrong independent of God’s commands; God’s commands are 
not relevant in determining the content of morality. This option seems 
to compromise God’s sovereignty in an important way. but the second 
horn of the dilemma presents seemingly insurmountable problems, as 
well. First, if God’s commands make right actions right, and there is no 
standard of morality independent of God’s commands, then that seems 
to make morality arbitrary. Thus, murder is not wrong because it harms 
someone unjustly, but merely because God forbids it; there is (it seems) 
no good connection between reason and the wrongness of murder. 
Furthermore, if God commanded us to torture an innocent child to 
death, then torturing an innocent child to death would (it seems) be 
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morally obligatory. most of us find these consequences absurd, and 
a sufficient reason for rejecting divine command theory.
Since the first horn of the dilemma represents moral obligations as 
being independent of God’s commands, a divine command theorist 
must somehow tackle the second horn of the dilemma. A tempting 
strategy is to say that while torturing an innocent child to death would 
be obligatory if God commanded this, God would never command such 
a thing because such a command would be contrary to His good and 
loving nature. However, such a move seems incompatible with divine 
command theory: it suggests that God is bound by moral requirements 
(He cannot command torturing an innocent child to death because such 
a command would be immoral), whereas divine command theory claims 
that God is the source of all moral requirements.1
However, a number of divine command theorists have argued 
recently that this move is legitimate. These theorists argue that divine 
command theory is not a theory of all moral values; it is merely a theory 
of moral obligation.2 We can still say that God is good, as long as we do 
not construe this goodness in terms of God doing what He ought to do. 
‘oughts’ (which apply to finite beings such as us humans) are in turn 
constituted by the commands of God. And since He is good, He would 
never command torturing an innocent child to death, and so the second 
horn of our euthyphro dilemma is defused. Thus, Wierenga writes, 
“bringing about a foully unjust state of affairs [S]…is incompatible 
with being loving and just; so then is commanding someone else to 
bring S about. Accordingly, since these are essential features of God’s 
character, they preclude his commanding that someone bring about 
S in any possible world.”3 Further, God’s nature provides God with 
adequate reason to issue the particular commands He does, alleviating 
the arbitrariness worry about divine command theory: this move seems 
to restore the relation between moral reasons and God’s commands.
I. WHAT IS GoD’S GooDNeSS?
Wherein does God’s goodness consist? Alston writes that God’s goodness 
supervenes on His lovingness and other such traits.4 A natural question 
1 For a particularly lucid statement of this objection, see Hooker (2001).
2 See, for example, Wierenga (1989), Adams (1999), Alston (2002), and Quinn (2006).
3 Wierenga (1989), p. 221.
4 Alston (2002).
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arises as to the relation between the traits that God manifests qua 
supremely good being and His goodness: are qualities like being merciful 
and loving traits of God because they are good, or are they good because 
they are traits of God? Simply put: why is it good to be loving? Is being 
loving independently good, apart from its being one of God’s traits? or is 
it good merely because God is loving? This is not simply another iteration 
of the euthyphro problem – is God loving because being loving is good 
or is being loving good because God is loving? – because the horns of this 
dilemma have somewhat different outcomes. In the original euthyphro 
dilemma, the worry about the second horn of the dilemma was that if 
right acts were right because God commanded them, then that made 
morality arbitrary – torture for fun is immoral, but God did not have 
a good (i.e., moral) reason for forbidding such torture, and there would 
have been nothing immoral about his commanding torture for fun. but 
the divine command theorist is not saying that the relation between the 
goodness of being loving and the fact of God’s lovingness is so arbitrary 
as that: it is not the mere fact of God’s being loving that makes it good to 
be loving. rather, it is the fact that God is loving, combined with the fact 
that God is supremely good that makes being loving good. As Alston 
puts the point,
We can think of God himself, the individual being, as the supreme 
standard of goodness…lovingness is good (a good-making feature, that 
on which goodness is supervenient) not because of the Platonic existence 
of a general principle or fact to the effect that lovingness is good, but 
because God, the supreme standard of goodness, is loving. Goodness 
supervenes on every feature of God, not because some general principles 
are true but just because they are features of God.5
So God is good (indeed, He is the supreme standard of goodness), 
and that is why His being loving makes being loving good. So it seems 
initially that the second option involves no arbitrariness: being loving is 
good because it is a trait of God, who is supremely good. (We will revisit 
this initial conclusion later, though.)
Notice, however, the order of explanation here. God is not good 
because He is loving. That would imply a standard of goodness 
independent of God, which divine command theorists like Alston and 
Adams must deny. They claim that God is the standard of goodness, that 
5 Alston (2002), pp. 291-2.
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whatever properties (such as being loving) God has are good in virtue of 
God’s essential goodness. Thus, God’s goodness must be logically prior 
to the goodness of God’s mercy, justice, lovingness, and so on. Indeed, 
Adams speculates that in a possible world with no God, nothing would 
be excellent or good, not even character traits we normally consider 
good (like being loving). Adams writes,
If there is a God that satisfies [the] conditions imposed by our concepts 
[of the Good], we might say, then excellence is the property of faithfully 
imaging such a God…In worlds where no such God exists, nothing would 
have that property, and therefore nothing would be excellent. but beings 
like us in such a world might have a concept subjectively indistinguishable 
from our concept of excellence, and there might be an objective property 
that corresponded to it well enough, and in a sufficiently salient way, to 
be the property signified by it, though it would not be the property that 
we in fact signify by ‘excellent’.6
Wainwright notes that an apparent consequence of Adams’s theory is 
that if there is a possible world where there is no God, and no plausible 
alternative candidate for the role of the Supreme Good, then assuming 
that “Adams’s account of the semantics of ‘good’ is more or less correct, 
then the term ‘good’ doesn’t pick out a real property in those worlds; 
the concept of good will be as empty in those worlds as the concept of 
phlogiston is in ours”.7 In those worlds, being (e.g.) loving is not good. 
God’s goodness is logically prior to the goodness of such traits, and their 
goodness depends on and is parasitic on the prior goodness of God.8
II. IS THIS VIeW oF GoD’S GooDNeSS CoHereNT?
Does this picture of God’s goodness make any sense?9 (Alston will be 
our primary interlocutor since he, more than others, has grappled with 
the problematic implications of this conception of God’s goodness.) 
6 Adams (1999), p. 46.
7 Wainwright (2005), p. 95.
8 of the authors under discussion, Alston alone disputes this; but I will argue below 
that Alston endorses incompatible theses about the relation between God’s goodness and 
the goodness of traits like mercy and justice.
9 This view of God’s goodness has had its critics; see, in particular, morriston (2001) 
and (2009) and Kowalski (2010). I will be approaching the issue from a somewhat 
different direction than these authors, trying to tease out whether the conception of 
God’s goodness proposed by Adams, Alston, and their allies is metaphysically coherent.
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Certainly, it seems to reverse the intuitive order of explanation between 
something’s goodness and the other properties it exemplifies. As Wes 
morriston writes in a penetrating critique of Alston’s view,
Is God good because He has these good-making properties? or are 
they good-making because God has them? The first alternative seems, 
intuitively, to be the right one. Why should it make any difference to the 
good-makingness of compassion, say, if there is (or isn’t) a supremely 
compassionate God?10
This is puzzling, but there is a deeper problem confronting the 
Adams/Alston account. Adams and Alston claim that God is good, but 
given the above order of explanation, they are debarred from pointing to 
any feature in virtue of which God is good. (Alston denies this, but I will 
argue that he cannot do so coherently; we will return to this point later.) 
rather, those features themselves are good in virtue of belonging to God 
(who is good). Then what does it mean to say that God is good? It doesn’t 
mean that He is just, or loving – His goodness is prior to the goodness 
of these features. Alston and Adams must say this, else admit that there 
is a  standard of goodness independent of God. So the property of 
goodness, as it applies to God, is undifferentiated, a ‘featureless property’. 
As Kowalski summarizes the problem,
How should we understand God, a particular concrete being, serving as 
the standard of goodness? In virtue of what does God so serve? In order 
to avoid grounding God’s goodness, as the Platonist would, in  truths 
that do not depend on God, it seems that God must somehow serve 
as the supreme standard of goodness apart from the properties He in 
fact possesses. It thus seems that God, qua bare particular, serves as the 
ultimate standard for moral goodness.11
The problem is this: actions and agents instantiate morally thin 
properties (rightness, goodness, etc.) in virtue of the morally thick 
properties these actions and agents instantiate. An action is not good 
simpliciter; it is good because it represents an act of charity, or a repaying 
of a debt, or something else. It is good in virtue of something else. Similar 
comments apply to the goodness of agents. The benefit of moving to 
the level of the descriptively thin is that it can be silent as to what this 
‘something else’ is – as elstein and Hurka write, “The mark of a thin 
10 morriston (2009), p. 253.
11 Kowalski (forthcoming), p. 5.
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concept like ‘right’ is that it says nothing about what other properties 
an item falling under it has”12 – but let us not take this silence to be 
metaphysical. We cannot use these thin concepts without remembering 
that at bottom they are paper currency whose value depends on a reserve 
of thick virtues.
III. AlSToN’S PArTICulArISm
Alston has addressed the worry that this strategy of making God the 
standard of moral goodness renders God’s goodness unintelligible. 
Alston writes:
Note that on this view we are not debarred from saying what is supremely 
good about God. God is not good, qua bare particular or undifferentiated 
thisness. God is good by virtue of being loving, just, merciful and so on.13
Does this answer the objection? It is unclear. For mark how the passage 
continues:
Where this view differs from its alternative is in the answer to the question, 
‘by virtue of what are these features of God good-making features?’ The 
answer given by this view is: ‘by virtue of being features of God.’14
So Alston is explicit here that these features are only good because God 
possesses them. As Alston writes earlier in his essay,
lovingness is good (is a good-making feature, that on which goodness is 
supervenient) not because of the Platonic existence of a general principle 
or fact to the effect that lovingness is good, but because God, the supreme 
standard of goodness, is loving. Goodness supervenes on every feature of 
God, not because some general principles are true but just because they 
are features of God.15
So we have a puzzle. The first passage indicates that God is good because 
of these good-making traits (such as lovingness, mercy, and so on). but 
the second and third quotes reverse the order of explanation: they say 
not that God is good because He possesses these traits, but that these 
traits are good-making because God possesses them. What is the correct 
order of explanation? Can Alston have it both ways? I will argue that he 
12 elstein and Hurka (2009), p. 516.
13 Alston (2002), p. 292.
14 Alston (2002), p. 292.
15 Alston (2002), pp. 291-2, emphasis added.
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cannot; Alston’s particularism requires that God’s goodness be logically 
prior to the goodness of the moral virtues. And we will see that this view 
is incoherent; it makes God’s goodness unintelligible.
Alston distinguishes between
(a) ‘Platonic’ predicates, the criterion for the application of which is 
a general ‘essence’ or ‘Idea’ that can be specified in purely general terms, 
and (b) ‘particularist’ predicates, the criterion for the application of 
which makes essential reference to one or more individuals.16
Alston suggests ‘triangle’ as a good paradigm of the former kind. Alston’s 
theory of the good is particularist: a particular individual (God) is the 
standard of goodness. Alston suggests an illuminating analogy:
A sub-type closer to our present concern is the much-discussed ‘meter’. 
let’s say that what makes a certain length a meter is its equality to 
a standard meter stick kept in Paris. What makes this table a meter in 
length is not its conformity to a Platonic essence but its conformity 
to a concretely existing individual. Similarly, on my present suggestion, 
what most ultimately makes an act of love a good thing is not its 
conformity to some general principle but its conformity to, or imitation 
of, God, who is both the ultimate source of the existence of things and 
the supreme standard by which they are to be assessed.17
To imagine the Paris meter bar as a particularist paradigm, we shall 
have to re-imagine its history to some extent. (And in the above quote, 
Alston seems to realize that treating the Paris meter bar as a genuine 
particularist example requires some fictionalization.) In real history, 
there was already a definition of the meter, and the meter bar was made 
in accordance with this definition. Thus, the meter bar was produced 
with the intention that it be precisely 1 meter long. Thus, real history 
causes the meter bar to diverge from Alston’s model of God, because the 
meter bar isn’t really a particularist model: it violates the requirement 
of the particularist model that the paradigm be the standard, instead of 
conforming to an external standard.
let us suppose, then, that the meter bar really does match Alston’s 
particularist model. let us suppose that there was no external standard 
of metric length prior to the creation of the meter bar, and that the meter 
bar really did establish, for the first time ever, the length of the meter, 
16 Alston (2002), p. 292.
17 Alston (2002), p. 292.
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and that the length of the meter was determined only by reference to this 
particular entity, the meter bar. Now this model fits Alston’s particularism: 
it is truly accurate to say that anything that is (or approximates) a meter 
is so purely in virtue of resembling the meter bar, and not in virtue of 
matching any pre-existing standard independent of the meter bar. It is 
a genuine particularist model, on our retelling of history. (And I think 
that something like this retelling is what Alston intends when he prefaces 
his discussion of the Paris meter bar with the phrase “let’s say that…”.)
Now consider an object – say, a piece of wood. This piece of wood has 
a particular length, l. Suppose this length, l, is the same length as that 
of the Paris meter bar. Thus, l is 1 meter. Which of the following claims 
is true?
(1) This particular length, l, is 1 meter because the Paris meter bar 
has this particular length.
(2) The Paris meter bar is 1 meter because it is this particular length, l.
If the Paris meter bar is a genuine particularist standard, (1) is true 
and (2) is false. As Alston writes, “What makes a certain length a meter is 
its equality to a standard meter stick kept in Paris.”18 (2) must be rejected 
for multiple reasons, not the least because it smacks of the Platonism 
rejected by Alston – “What makes this table a meter in length is not its 
conformity to a Platonic essence but its conformity to a concretely existing 
individual.”19 but more importantly, (2) reverses the order of explanation 
– the measurement of the meter bar isn’t fixed by comparison with some 
abstract length, or by comparison with some external standard. rather, 
the meter bar is the standard which determines the unit of measure 
for l and other lengths. That is how a particularist model works. So 
understanding the Paris meter bar as a particularist example, (1) is true 
and (2) is false.
but understanding particularist examples like the Paris meter bar 
sheds light on Alston’s particularist model of goodness. For sentences 
precisely parallel to (1) and (2) can also be constructed with respect to 
God, goodness, and the virtues:
(3) These particular virtues (lovingness, mercy, etc.) are good because 
God possesses these particular virtues.
(4) God is good because God possesses these particular virtues 
(lovingness, mercy, etc.)
18 Alston (2002), p. 292.
19 Alston (2002), p. 292.
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(3) and (4) are precisely parallel in structure to (1) and (2)20; and with 
the particularist example of the Paris meter bar, (1) is true and (2) is 
false. (2) is false because with particularism, the order of explanation 
goes in a particular direction: from the exemplar toward the traits the 
exemplar is established to exemplify. The order of explanation does not 
reverse; if it does, you are not a particularist. This strongly suggests that 
if we construe God as a particularist paradigm, as Alston intends, we 
should likewise find (3) to be true and (4) to be false.
The Paris meter bar example reveals something about particularism. 
With particularism, the order of explanation goes one way: it goes from 
the exemplar to the specific traits it possesses, conferring some status on 
them. The meter bar confers meter-hood on its specific length; that is its 
job as the particularist model of the meter. The order of explanation does 
not reverse: meter-ness, as a Platonic entity or independently-defined 
length, does not define the meter bar as being a meter long. Similarly, 
God defines the virtues as good, by being the particularist model of 
goodness. The virtues do not confer goodness on God, any more than 
a meter length confers meter-hood on the meter bar.
let us apply this lesson to the theory endorsed by Alston, Adams, 
Craig and company. We have seen that it is the function of particularist 
exemplars to have a particular logical priority, a particular order of 
explanation. The meter bar exists to confer ‘meter-hood’ on particular 
lengths. lengths do not confer meter-hood on the meter bar; that would 
reverse the order of explanation and violate particularism by implying 
a standard prior to the meter bar for judging lengths. Similarly, if God 
is to serve as a particularist exemplar, He must confer goodness on the 
virtues. The virtues cannot confer goodness on him, cannot explain 
wherein God’s goodness consists. For to say that God is good because 
20 We can show that 1 and 3 have exactly the same structure: A is B because C has the 
same A (with the implication that the explanation is provided by the fact that C is B). 
Substituting terms for variables A, b and C, 1 becomes:
This length is 1 meter because the meter bar has this length (and the meter bar is 1 meter).
3 becomes:
Virtues (like kindness) are good because God has the same virtues (and God is good).
The parallel structure of 2 and 4 can also be shown: C is B because it has A (with the 
implication that the explanation is provided by the fact that A is B). Again, substituting 
for variables, 2 becomes:
The meter bar is 1 meter because it is this length (and this length is 1 meter)
4 becomes:
God is good because he has virtues like kindness (and the virtues are themselves good).
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he possesses these virtues, or that God’s goodness supervenes on these 
virtues, is to reject particularism in favour of some theory that locates 
the source of moral value outside of God. Wes morriston has recognized 
this point:
Is God good because He has these good-making properties?...If this is 
the right way to look at the matter, then moral goodness supervenes 
directly on the good-making properties, and it makes not the slightest 
difference to their good-makingness who has them. A person is morally 
good to the degree that she possesses these properties. That goes for God 
as much as for anyone else. but then we are right back in the box we 
were trying to get out of. God is subject to an independent standard of 
goodness…21
Alston cannot consistently maintain that “God is good by virtue of being 
loving, just, merciful and so on”22 and be a particularist. If he wants to 
be a particularist, the order of explanation can only go in one direction: 
the character traits like being loving, just and merciful are virtues – are 
good – just because they are possessed by God.
There are other ways of seeing how on Alston’s view, God’s goodness 
must be logically prior to the goodness of the particular moral virtues. 
That this is so can be seen by looking at another objection to Alston’s 
account raised by morriston. morriston writes,
Alston’s point…is that explanation must come to an end somewhere. 
Whatever our ultimate standard is – whether it is an individual paradigm 
or a general principle of the sort favored by Platonists – that is as far as 
we can go. If Alston cannot say what makes goodness supervene on God’s 
characteristics, neither can the Platonist say what makes it supervene on 
a bunch of properties. In either case, it just does supervene, and that is 
all there is to say. but even if this is right, we can still ask which stopping 
point is preferable. If we have to stop somewhere, why not stop with 
the special combination of love and justice that make up God’s moral 
character? Why go further and insist that goodness supervenes on these 
characteristics only because they are characteristics of the particular 
individual who is God? From the point of view of moral theory, it is hard 
to see any real advantage in doing this; it complicates things considerably, 
and the theological window-dressing seems quite superfluous.23
21 morriston (2009), p. 253.
22 Alston (2002), p. 292.
23 morriston (2001), p. 132.
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of course, Adams’ and Alston’s answer to morriston’s hypothetical 
question (“Why not stop with the special combination of love and 
justice…?”) must be that if these were not characteristics of God, they 
wouldn’t be virtues – they wouldn’t be good. recall our discussion of 
Adams’ theory of the semantics of ‘good’ – for Adams, in a world without 
God, there might be traits such as lovingness and justice, but they wouldn’t 
be good, per se. As Wainwright commented, assuming that “Adams’s 
account of the semantics of ‘good’ is more or less correct, then the term 
‘good’ doesn’t pick out a real property in those worlds; the concept of 
good will be as empty in those worlds as the concept of phlogiston is in 
ours.”24 Alston, as we have seen, seems to make a similar claim, writing,
lovingness is good (is a good-making feature, that on which goodness is 
supervenient) not because of the Platonic existence of a general principle 
or fact to the effect that lovingness is good, but because God, the supreme 
standard of goodness, is loving. Goodness supervenes on every feature of 
God, not because some general principles are true but just because they 
are features of God.25
Notice the crucial phrases: ‘because … just because…”. The clear 
implication is that the virtues are virtues – are good – just because there 
is a God who exemplifies these traits. These traits have no independent 
power to impart goodness on something. If there were no God, and 
someone were loving, merciful, and so forth, then that person (on the 
Adams/Alston view) would not be good. Thus, God’s goodness is logically 
prior to the goodness of these traits – these traits are not intrinsically 
good (for without God, they are not good). God is good, and in virtue 
of God’s possession of these traits, they too are good. We see, then, that 
God cannot be good in virtue of these traits, because God’s goodness 
must be logically prior to the goodness of these traits. So with this in 
mind, let us recall Alston’s quote, cited earlier:
Note that on this view we are not debarred from saying what is supremely 
good about God. God is not good, qua bare particular or undifferentiated 
thisness. God is good by virtue of being loving, just, merciful and so on.26
This cannot be right. God cannot be good by virtue of possessing these 
traits, because these traits don’t have the power to confer goodness upon 
God. God’s goodness is logically prior to the goodness of these traits, 
24 Wainwright (2005), p. 95.
25 Alston (2002), pp. 291-2, emphasis added.
26 Alston (2002), p. 292.
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so logically speaking God’s goodness comes first, and then comes the 
goodness of these traits. You cannot explain God’s goodness in terms 
of His being “loving, just, merciful, and so on,” because the goodness 
of these traits is logically subsequent to God’s goodness, and is to be 
explained in terms of the latter property.
IV. THe INCoHereNCe oF AlSToN’S VIeW
I conclude that God’s goodness cannot be explained in terms of the 
goodness of the concrete virtues. We cannot say that God is good because 
He is loving, merciful, just and so on. Again, this violates our normal 
understanding of thin moral concepts: agents are not good simpliciter, 
but are good because they embody thick moral concepts, like lovingness 
and justice. but the particularism defended by Alston prevents him from 
explaining God’s goodness in this way, and saddles him with a notion of 
divine goodness that is empty of content.
How can Alston reply? Perhaps one can argue that we can say 
something about even such a stripped down property: we can say (with 
Aquinas) that “the essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some 
way desirable”.27 The problem is that God’s goodness, understood in the 
minimalist way outlined above, is a total blank, stripped of any feature 
that would make intelligible why it is desirable or worthy of pursuit.
The essential problem in the Adams/Alston view can be brought into 
sharp relief by discussing another objection addressed by Alston. Speaking 
for his opponent, Alston writes, “Isn’t it arbitrary to take some particular 
individual, even the supreme individual, as the standard of goodness, 
regardless of whether this individual conforms to general principles of 
goodness or not?”28 In response to this objection, Alston writes,
An answer to the question, ‘What is good about?’ will, sooner or later, 
cite certain good-making characteristics. We can then ask why we should 
suppose that good supervenes on those characteristics. In answer either 
a general principle or an individual paradigm is cited. but whichever 
it is, that is the end of the line…on both views something is taken to 
be ultimate, behind which we cannot go, in the sense of finding some 
explanation of the fact that it is constitutive of goodness.29
27 Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia.5.1. Quoted in Wierenga (1989), p. 202. As Wierenga 
notes, though, Aquinas is not talking specifically about moral goodness here.
28 Alston (2002), p. 293.
29 Alston (200), p. 293.
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There are a few comments that need to be made at this point. First, 
Alston is making a familiar point about explanatory regress, and solving 
it in a familiar way: eventually, you reach a stopping point in the regress 
of explanations, and some principle or exemplar must be taken as 
ultimate. While this may, in some instances, be an acceptable move, it 
is not acceptable in all cases. one’s stopping point must be intelligible 
as a stopping point. For example, when Aristotle conducts his familiar 
inquiry into the ultimate telos of all human action, the stopping point 
he finds – eudaimonia, happiness, or flourishing – is intelligible as 
a stopping point for such an inquiry. It has features that make sense of 
it as a goal of human striving. but, as we have already seen, God is not 
morally good in virtue of any of the familiar characteristics (such as 
being just or loving). God’s moral goodness is utterly blank, without any 
features that make it intelligible as a stopping place in an inquiry into the 
ultimate foundation of goodness. Since Alston and Adams make God’s 
goodness prior to any of God’s concrete moral virtues, the person of God 
is not intelligible as a stopping place in the quest for the ultimate source 
of good. God’s supposed goodness, as I said above, is a complete blank, 
lacking any features whatsoever that would make it intuitively appealing 
why the object in question should be regarded as the ultimate exemplar 
of moral goodness.30 
Alston writes that it is ‘self-evident’ that God is the ultimate exemplar 
of moral goodness, and a legitimate stopping place:
I would invite one who finds the invocation of God as the supreme 
standard arbitrary, to explain why it is more arbitrary than the invocation 
of a supreme general principle. Perhaps it is because it seems self-evident 
to him that the principle is true. but it seems self-evident to some that 
God is the supreme standard. And just as my opponent will explain the 
lack of self-evidence to some people of this general principle by saying 
that they have not considered it sufficiently, in an impartial frame of 
mind or whatever, so the theistic particularist will maintain that those 
who don’t acknowledge God as the supreme standard are insufficiently 
acquainted with God, or have not sufficiently considered the matter.31
In our regress of justification, we ultimately encounter some principle 
or exemplar, and the truth of this principle (or the exemplariness of this 
30 We have seen above, in the second lengthy quote by morriston, how he criticizes 
Alston’s choice of stopping places in the regress of explanations.
31 Alston (2002), p. 293.
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exemplar) is self-evident or known via intuition. once again, our question 
must be, ‘Is this plausible?’ Alston implies that one who is sufficiently 
acquainted with God and who has given the matter adequate, impartial 
thought will come to see (with justification or warrant) that God is the 
standard of moral perfection. but we can now see why this is wrong. For 
when one imagines acquaintance with God, and contemplation of the 
divine, one naturally imagines contemplating God given his attributes – 
such as being perfectly loving, just, merciful, and so forth. And of course 
someone who contemplated God as so presented might well come to 
believe in God’s moral perfection. but Alston must claim that God is the 
standard of moral perfection independently of his possession of these 
characteristics. He is not morally perfect because he possesses these 
characteristics; these characteristics are features of moral perfection only 
because they are possessed by God. Thus, what Alston should exhort 
us to do is this: imagine God, stripped of every moral perfection – His 
lovingness, His justice, His caring. Now is it self-evident that God as so 
conceived is morally perfect, the ultimate standard of good? Intuition 
is not a magical power; it needs something to work with. If intuition 
is a genuine mental power (and presumably, if it is, it is the power of 
forming non-inferential beliefs in response to some stimulus or mental 
input), then intuition requires inputs to generate an output. When Alston 
tells us that God’s moral perfection is self-evident, he is imagining God’s 
moral virtues as cognitive inputs, in which case we should expect as an 
output the belief “God is the standard of goodness”. but the question 
must be reconceived: ‘Does it make sense to say of God, independent 
of these virtues, that He is good?’ I have argued this is not coherent; it is 
certainly not self-evident that God so conceived is the ultimate standard 
of moral perfection.
Anyhow, this discussion of self-evidence may mislead us: the problem 
we are dealing with is metaphysical, not epistemological. Alston presents 
the regress problem almost as an epistemological problem: how do we 
identify the ultimate source of good? If we have some knowledge of what 
traits (such as being loving and just) are good, then (plausibly) we need 
only find the being who exemplifies these traits to the maximal degree to 
find the exemplar of the good. but the problem we are grappling with is 
metaphysical, not epistemological: we are not (merely) trying to identify 
the source of good; we are trying to explain how it confers goodness on 
all things. So we cannot help ourselves to these virtuous traits (even if we 
know they are virtuous), because our problem is to explain how they are 
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virtuous, not merely to identify which being is most virtuous. We must 
consider the source of these traits’ goodness (God), and ask, “How is it that 
this being confers goodness on these traits?” Alston, Adams, Craig and 
others answer, “In virtue of being supremely good.” but once we confine 
ourselves to a strictly metaphysical investigation, we see that this statement 
is meaningless, because we are debarred from appealing to any features 
of God which might make His goodness coherent, or explain why His 
goodness is worthy of admiration or capable of conferring praiseworthiness 
on the traits (such as lovingness and justice) that He possesses.
I said when we began our discussion of the regress of explanations 
that a few comments were in order. Here is another: we must distinguish 
between explanations-why and explanations-what. even if explanations-
why come to an end, and no further reasons can be given at this point, 
it does not follow that at this point there can be no further explanation-
what. For we should still be able to explain what something is even if 
we can give no further explanation for why it is the way that it is. For 
example: suppose (contrary to fact) that the electron’s negative charge 
were simply a brute fact, and that no explanation could be given for why 
electrons have a negative charge. This would be an example of running to 
the end of explanations for why things are the way they are. but we could 
still give an explanation of what a negative charge is: how it interacts with 
positively-charged items (like protons), what the strength of its electrical 
charge is, and so forth. So even if we can say nothing about why the 
electron has this charge, we can say quite a lot about what this charge is.
To deny this with respect to God’s goodness is to conflate the two types 
of explanation, explanations why and explanations what. (This confusion 
is, I think, a natural consequence of confusing the epistemological and 
the metaphysical.) The particularist says, in explaining why certain 
things are good, that at some point these why-explanations run out when 
we arrive at the exemplar of God’s character. but this does not entail the 
absence of any what-explanations, and we should still be able to say what 
God’s moral goodness consists in. but the particularist has debarred us 
from doing this: since God’s goodness is prior to any feature we could cite 
in an explanation (what) of God’s goodness, we cannot say what God’s 
goodness is. It is, again, a featureless property. The particularist is not 
just saying that there is an end to why-explanations; she is saying that no 
what-explanation can be given either. And that is simply not plausible, 
since this makes God’s goodness completely unintelligible.
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one might argue that one can give some sort of what-explanation 
about God’s goodness. If Adams et al cannot explain God’s goodness 
in terms of concrete virtues (such as lovingness, mercy and justice), 
perhaps they can attempt to explain this goodness without reference 
to these virtues. That is, instead of giving the explanation in terms of 
morally thick virtues (such as mercy, justice, kindness, etc.), they can 
give the explanation at the more abstract level of morally thin virtues 
(such as ‘morally good’). As the description in question couldn’t make 
reference to the specific thick virtues, this description would of necessity 
have to be somewhat general in nature. but it might nevertheless be 
a satisfactory what-explanation. Can you say anything substantive about 
the morally thin virtues that doesn’t rely, even implicitly, on the morally 
thick virtues?
Perhaps one could say that God’s goodness consisted of God always 
doing what was right. This won’t work, though, as theological voluntarists 
have specifically bifurcated their moral theory to respond to the original 
euthyphro problem for divine command theory: there is a theory of the 
good for God, and a theory of obligation for finite beings like humans. 
more importantly, though, good must be definable antecedent to right 
(since it is God’s goodness that gives God reason to issue the particular 
commands that He does). Thus, on this view, good is logically prior to 
the right, and so it must be possible to give a definition of ‘good’ that 
makes no reference to rightness, obligation, or other cognate notions.
one cannot say that God’s goodness consists in that He always does 
the good, for not only is that definition circular, but it uses a predicate 
(good) that we are already complaining is undefined.
Consider again Aquinas’ suggestion: “the essence of goodness 
consists in this, that it is in some way desirable.”32 However, as Scanlon33 
and Quinn34 have argued, something is desirable not because you desire 
it, but because it has features that render it desirable – that is, in some 
way good. Now, there is a clear risk of circularity here – “the essence of 
goodness consists in this, that it is in some way good” – so to render 
our formulation non-circular, we must specify the precise ways in which 
God is good: we must specify the features of God that render Him 
desirable, good. but if there were specific features of God, in virtue of 
32 Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia.5.1. Quoted in Wierenga (1989), p. 202.
33 See Scanlon 1998, particularly pp. 43ff.
34 Quinn (1993), chapter 12.
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which He was good, then we would be thrown back on the first horn of 
our dilemma: God is good in virtue of certain features (and hence there 
is a standard of goodness independent of God).
Indeed, the whole problem of trying to move the explanations-what 
up to the level of thin virtues must fail. As I have repeatedly emphasized, 
agents instantiate morally thin properties (such as goodness) in 
virtue of the morally thick properties these agents instantiate. Alston’s 
particularism cannot countenance this fact, and so must fail as 
a supplement to the divine command theory.
In a last-ditch move, one might cite authors (like G.e. moore) who 
have argued that the Good is unanalyzable. but even if moore was right, 
he merely meant that one could not analytically reduce the Good to other 
non-normative or non-moral concepts. So, when moore argued that the 
Good was unanalyzable, he simply meant that it was not definitionally 
reducible; he didn’t mean that it was inexplicable. So the divine command 
theorist will find no comfort coming from that quarter.
Thus, Alston must commit to one or the other horn of the dilemma. His 
particularism commits him to the second horn of the dilemma. In short, 
Alston must answer the question, “Why is being loving good?” by saying, 
“Traits (like being loving) are good-making because God has them, and 
God is good.” but on Alston’s particularism, when we say “God is good”, 
we haven’t said anything, because Alston’s particularism prevents him 
from giving any concrete articulation of what goodness is. unfortunately, 
on the particularist theory, we have no more (or less) reason to declare 
God essentially good than to declare Him essentially fnord or bxtzs; for 
by calling God ‘good’ we haven’t really said anything at all.
CoNCluSIoN
Adams writes that “the part played by God in my account of the nature 
of the good is similar to the Form of the beautiful or the Good in Plato’s 
Symposium and Republic. God is the supreme Good, and the goodness of 
other things consists in a sort of resemblance to God.”35 In a similar vein, 
Alston writes, “I want to suggest…that we can think of God himself, 
the individual being, as the supreme standard of goodness. God plays 
the role in evaluation that is more usually assigned, by objectivists about 
35 Adams (1999), p. 7.
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value, to Platonic Ideas or principles.”36 but as we have seen, since Adams 
and Alston are forced to make the goodness of God logically prior to any 
of the traits that might plausibly constitute God’s goodness, it is not at all 
clear what is meant by the claim that God is the standard of goodness, 
for the simple reason that it is not clear what is meant by the claim that 
God is good. To make any sense of the claim that God is good, the traits 
constitutive of goodness (such as being loving) must be good prior 
to God’s goodness: it must be the case that God is good because he is 
loving, and not the case that being loving is good because God is loving. 
but this requires a repudiation of the particularism that is at the heart 
of views like Adams’ and Alston’s. This would also require a standard 
of moral goodness that is independent of God’s nature. one could make 
it dependent on God’s will or commandments or decisions, but of course 
that throws us back in the original arbitrariness problem. Thus, it seems 
as though an adequate solution to the euthyphro problem requires that 
God be constrained by standards of moral goodness that are external to 
Himself.37 Perhaps this creates problems for divine sovereignty and the 
like, but that is separate problem.38 
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